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Military Culture and Jeffrey W. Legro
Inadvertent Escalation
in World War U
H ow can the use of
"unthinkable" means of warfare be avoided? How can states successfully
observe mutually desired limitations on "taboo" forms of combat?1 These
questions are important because of concern that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and terrorism will spread and be used. The growing number
of states-e.g., Israel, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Ukraine-that have such

means of inflicting harm increases the likelihood that any future conflict will
involve a desire for restrictions. Countries may pursue restraint because

popular opinion vilifies certain weapons;2 because leaders calculate that escalation would damage their domestic and international political support;3 or
because states fear retaliatory attacks. Unfortunately, even when nations
agree that limitations are desirable, restraint does not always endure. A key

source of this disparity can be found in accidents and inadvertent escalation.
In contemporary affairs among major powers, the apparent absence of

grounds for intentional aggression, against a backdrop of change and insta-

bility, makes the unintended expansion of conflict a central concern.4 States
may not seek a spiral of hostility but still can stumble into escalation. Why?
Jeffrey W. Legro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.

I am grateful to Robert Jervis, Ido Oren, Arthur Stein, Richard Rosecrance, and two anonymous
reviewers for their comments on the ideas presented here.

1. The term "unthinkable" comes from Herman Kahn's study on nuclear warfare, Thinking About
the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press 1962). Here the terms "unthinkable" or "taboo" indicate
the stigma attached by public opinion and the international community to the use of certain
instruments of warfare. It does not mean that states, and especially their military organizations,
do not think about, and plan for, their use in war.
2. Often there seems to be little logic to such a stigma. For example, in World War II it became
acceptable to the allies to roast Japanese soldiers alive in caves with flame throwers, while the
use of gas for the same task was considered by some to be illegitimate. There is a large literature
on the "just" use of force from a moral or legal perspective. See e.g., Michael Walzer, Just and
Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Geoffrey
Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); William V. O'Brien, The
Conduct of a Just and Litnited War (New York: Praeger, 1981).
3. In the 1990-91 Gulf War bomber and missile attacks against targets in Iraq, the U.S.-led
coalition made concerted efforts to avoid civilian casualties which might show up on television
and promote opposition to the war.
4. Accidents and inadvertence have received considerable attention recently. See Scott D. Sagan,

The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, anid Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton Universit
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An intriguing set of cases from the Second World War offers new insights

and leverage on the problem of taboo warfare and inadvertence.5 In the
interwar years, three means of warfare were especially singled out and
denigrated as inhumane and illegitimate: submarine attacks against merchant

ships, the aerial bombing of non-military targets, and the use of poison gas.

At the outset of World War II, countries explicitly recognized and desired a
distinct limit or "firebreak" between restraint and escalation in each of the

three means of warfare, despite the fact that all were considered militarily
significant. Shortly after fighting broke out, however, submarine warfare

escalated beyond restrictions. Strategic bombing, restrained at first, was later

employed extensively. In contrast chemical weapons, despite expectations
and preparations, were never used. Accidents and inadvertence, while not

always the main factor, were involved in each of these cases.6 How were
these incidents allowed to occur? Why did some unintended events lead to
escalation, while others were brushed aside allowing restraint to endure?
I argue that the main existing theories of inadvertence-Clausewitz's no-

tion of friction, the security dilemma, and organization theory7-provide poor

predictions for the events of World War JJ.8 I develop and test an alternative
approach, organizational culture, that provides a better explanation. Military
cultures-beliefs and norms about the optimal means to fight wars-are
important because they have a pervasive impact on the preferences and
actions of both armies and states. While traditional organizational theory

Press, 1993); Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cor
University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings, 1993).

5. Much of the literature is limited by its focus on the bipolar U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition.
The emerging multi-polar nuclear world, however, makes the historical experience of countries
other than the two superpowers increasingly relevant, especially if, as I argue, restraint is
influenced by national traits. The narrow concern with nuclear warfare precludes historical
analysis of variations in use in this form of combat because of the welcome absence of instances
of inadvertent nuclear escalation. One study that takes a historical comparative perspective on
escalation is Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1977).

6. My broader study Cooperation Under Fire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming)
examines the overall pattern of cooperation and conflict implicit in the restraint and escalation
of World War II. This article focuses on the accidental and inadvertent elements of escalation
rather than the intentional decisions of states to violate limitations.
7. These three are highlighted by Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 12-23.
8. A fourth image might be based on a realist "strategic rationality." However, the focus of this
essay is inadvertence where states do not desire escalation. From the perspective of a unitary
state, a strategic rationale for accidental escalation makes little sense. Nonetheless, strategic
rationality is discussed at different points below in order to better delineate the organizational
culture approach.
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emphasizes the importance of formal structure in causing uniform military
behavior, a cultural approach contends that differences in belief can lead to
dissimilar actions.9 Military organizational cultures not only influence what

types of accidents might occur, but more importantly, what the implications
of those incidents will be for escalation. Where specific means of warfare are
compatible with the dominant war-fighting culture of a country's key military
services, that nation is likely to take actions that contribute to escalation. In

such situations, the military will emphasize the antagonistic role the other
side played, encourage propagandistic use of the incident, and highlight the
advantages in escalation. Yet when a type of warfare is antithetical to one
side's military culture, that state will support restraint even in the face of
provocative enemy incidents. It will suppress information that might encourage escalation, accept accidents as such regardless of evidence, make
efforts to communicate good will to the opposing side, and reject any internal
proposals to seize propaganda advantages. In short, organizational culture
leads to dynamics in use and restraint that are not predicted by the randomness of friction, the security dilemma, or traditional organization theory.
This argument has implications for both theory and policy. Much of the

work in the security studies literature has emphasized the international determinants of the use of force such as the military balance, the struggle for

security, or the prevailing norms or laws of war.10 This emphasis, however,
has tended to ignore important domestic determinants of escalation. The

historical cases below indicate the powerful influence of organizational dy-

9. Whereas a cultural approach predicts that militaries can either foster or inhibit escalation,
work in the traditional school such as Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Barry Posen, The Sources of Military
Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984); Posen, Inadvertent Escalation; and Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), anticipates that all militaries will favor offense
and tend to provoke escalation in war. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation
and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) challenges the monolithic view
of organizations in his study of innovation, which emphasizes the politics of promotion, measures of strategic effectiveness, and the management of innovation. I argue that culture is critical
to each of these three factors.

10. Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the International System," World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (October 1961), p. 115; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and
Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 13-16; Theodore Lowi, The
End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: Norton, 1969),
pp. 158-160; Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 59-79, 228-236; Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October
1984), pp. 1-23; Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 17-26.
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namics within nation-states. My contention is not that militaries always tend

to foster escalation, as traditional organization theory would suggest. Rather,
the point is that the armed forces, depending on their culture, can either
reinforce restraint or instigate escalation. In the past, countries have made
considerable efforts both to reach diplomatic agreements (e.g., the Hotline,
the Incidents at Sea accords) and to develop technical procedures (e.g.,
permissive action links [PALS] on nuclear weapons) intended to control
unwanted events. My thesis suggests that leaders concerned with avoiding
undesired escalation in future conflicts must also pay attention to and man-

age, not only the military organizations that implement the use of force, but

also the beliefs and norms that characterize those organizations. This is no
small task and it may demand a new system of civil-military relations, a topic
taken up in the conclusion.
I develop this argument by first exploring the logic of three traditional

approaches to inadvertent escalation-friction, the security dilemma, tradi-

tional organization theory-and the new one, organizational culture. These
ideas, particularly the organizational culture perspective, are then assessed
in comparative cases involving inadvertence in submarine, aerial, and chem-

ical warfare between Britain and Germany in World War II. Finally, the
concluding sections draw together the empirical evidence and outline the
import of the findings for theory and policy on escalation and restraint.

Images of Inadvertence
It might seem contradictory to speak of explanations of accidents and inad-

vertent escalation-phenomena that seem inherently unpredictable-but explanations do in fact exist. There are two elements demanding explanation.
The first is to account for the origins of accidents-those unintended and
unexpected events. The second issue, central here, is how to explain the

consequences of accidents: why some lead to the widespread crossing of a
recognized limit on war, while others are ignored and restraint endures. Four

approaches offer answers: Clausewitz's notion of friction, the security dilemma, traditional organization theory, and organizational culture.
FRICTION

The most widely accepted theory on accidents is Clausewitz's thesis pre-

sented in On War. He posits that accidents are unpredictable. His term for
this is "friction" or "the fog of war." This concept asserts that a variety of
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factors can impose themselves unexpectedly between plans and actual outcomes. For example, communication and control of forces are difficult in
war; amidst the chaos of combat, intelligence is often uncertain or misleading;

soldiers get scared or tired and make mistakes. Clausewitz writes, "This
tremendous friction which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few
points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that

cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance."11
His theme is that accidents are random and unavoidable under the de-

mands of battle. Clausewitz's ideas make intuitive and empirical sense. By
their very definition, accidents have multiple and often unforeseeable causes.

This thesis is somewhat blunt and only gives the most general notion of why
and how they might come about. Nonetheless, the logic of Clausewitz's ideas
suggests that unintended escalation is particularly likely when the employment of force is complex, when the battle is intense, and when information

(on what one should do, or what the enemy is doing) is uncertain.12
The mishaps of the 1980 U.S. raid to free the hostages held in Iran exemplify the complexity, intensity, and "fog" problems that can beset military
operations. The rescue effort was a high-stakes, high-risk multi-service mis-

sion in unfamiliar enemy territory. Although the weather forecast was for
clear skies, the helicopters ran into giant dust clouds. At the "uninhabited"
meeting spot in the middle of the Iranian desert, the rescue team encountered
a bus-load of Iranian travellers. Three helicopters suffered problems that

grounded them and resulted in the collapse of the overall operation. One
helicopter was forced down by a crew member's simple mistake of leaving

a flak jacket or duffel bag over an engine cooling unit.13 No one could have
foreseen these particular difficulties, but as Clausewitz warns, given the
complexity and pressures of the operation, some undesired incidents were
unavoidable.

11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and transl. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 120; also see pp. 113-122.
12. Modern day accident theorists echo Clausewitz's thesis by positing that unwanted incidents
will be more likely in areas of warfare where there is technical and organizational complexity.
Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technology (New York: Basic Books, 1984),
pp. 3-4, 330-335. Perrow's argument is that complex organizations that deal with high-risk
technologies will inevitably incur accidents. An application of this thesis in the military realm
is Chris C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed
Services (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). For a test of this thesis vis-a-vis the nuclear
weapons accidents of the United States, see Sagan, The Limits of Safety.
13. Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1985), esp. chapters 4 and 5.
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THE SECURITY DILEMMA

What Robert Jervis and others have called the "security dilemma" links the
structure and technology that characterize a conflict situation to the possi-

bility of inadvertence.14 This dilemma is produced by the anarchic nature of
international relations that causes distrust among states: one states's defen-

sive efforts can make others less secure. The resulting insecurity leads to
action and reaction, producing spirals of hostility and escalation, ending in
an arms race or the actual use of force.
It is easy to grasp how the insecurity and uncertainty characteristic of

ongoing armed conflict would produce fear on each side that the other might

abrogate a pledge of non-use in order to gain an advantage. The security
dilemma is magnified and escalation made likely when defensive capabilities
cannot be distinguished from offensive ones and offense has the advantage.
This structural circumstance seems particularly likely to lead to first use in

two ways. First, when a state's doctrines or weapons depend on surprise for

effectiveness, that country has an incentive to undertake a first strike. Recognizing this incentive, an opponent is likely to be especially nervous about

its vulnerabilities and will keep a tight finger on its trigger.15 Leaders may
face a "use-'em-or-lose-'em" dilemma, in which they perceive that their own
security is endangered if they do not act first; this invites preemptive escalation. Thus, according to security dilemma logic, in war inadvertent escalation is likely when first-strike or use-'em-or-lose-'em incentives are present.

One example of the dangers of this dilemma comes from the fable of King
Arthur at the battle of Camlan; a negotiation between two suspicious armies

erupted into unpremeditated slaughter when one soldier drew his sword to
kill a snake and others, thinking that a battle had begun, followed suit to

defend themselves.16 Similarly in 1890, during a U.S. Army search of a Sioux
village, both soldiers and inhabitants had a tense grip on their rifles. When
one rifle accidentally went off, a storm of unintended and unanticipated

gunfire was unleashed; this became known as the Battle of Wounded Knee.17

14. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2
(January 1978), pp. 167-214. This dilemma is also captured by the notion of the "reciprocal fear

of surprise attack" in Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 207-208.

15. Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," pp. 187-205.
16. This comes from Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton Uni-

versity Press, 1961), p. 525, cited in Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War," Ph.D. diss. (University
of California at Berkeley, 1984), pp. 40-41, where other examples of inadvertence can be found.
17. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, p. 263, describes this and other examples of accidental escalation.
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The security dilemma notion captures how insecurity in certain situations
can lead to unintended outcomes.

ORGANIZATIONS: TRADITIONAL APPROACH

A third perspective on accidents and escalation derives from organization

theory applied to professional military bureaucracies. There are two variants:
one that is quite common in the literature I will call "traditional," while a
second relies on a cultural perspective. The traditional view of militaries is

that, like all organizations, they seek to maximize autonomy and size and to

reduce uncertainty.18 In the armed forces, these tendencies are expected to
produce certain common characteristics, such as that militaries will prefer
offensive strategies and that they will resist civilian intervention in opera-

tional planning and implementation.19 The underlying premise of the traditional perspective is that similarly structured organizations with similar functions should have similar interests and behavior.20
In a general sense, the traditional perspective expects escalation because
restraint contradicts the very nature of autonomy-seeking, offense-oriented,

war-winning military organizations. Research has indicated that soldiers do
not necessarily desire war, but that after the war is under way, professional

warriors do seek operational autonomy and are inclined to use all means at

their disposal. Gradualism and restraint can cost lives and are inconsistent
with such hallowed military principles as concentration of force and the goal

of total victory.21 From a traditional organizational perspective, there is little
reason to expect any dampening of escalation based on organizational influ-

18. Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 67-100.
19. Building on Allison's work, this is the interpretation given by Posen, Sources of Military
Doctrine, pp. 41-59; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the
Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 24-25; Stephen Van Evera, "Why
Cooperation Failed in 1914," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 97; Van Evera, "Causes of War," esp. chapter 7; Leon Sigal,
Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 19-25. Snyder and Van Evera, while emphasizing the
structural tendencies toward similarities among organizations (e.g., militaries are offense-oriented), seem to allow for the possibility of a defensive policy, depending on organizational
essence. The latter view is more compatible with the notion of organizational culture developed
below. On organizational essence see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974), p. 28.
20. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 37 states this most explicitly: "[Organization theory]
predicts similar behavior of units in the context of similar structures."
21. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.

Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation | 115

ence.22 This perspective, however, would anticipate that accidents and inadvertent escalation are particularly likely in ways that are compatible with
the standard operating procedures of the armed forces-i.e., where military

organizations have developed routines for use of a particular means of war-

fare.23 The proposition that follows from traditional logic is that inadvertent
escalation is more likely in any means of warfare where military organizations
have developed routines for use of that means.24
ORGANIZATIONS: CULTURAL APPROACH

An organizational culture view of inadvertent escalation predicts a different

dynamic. In the last decade, culture has emerged as a central concept in
organizational research, primarily in the field of business management.25 The
reason for this development was dissatisfaction with existing structural and
functional organizational studies such as those found in the traditional approach discussed above. More specifically, analysts were puzzled why Japanese firms performed so differently (i.e., better) when their formal structures
were so similar to those of Western companies. Many have contended that
the answer is organizational culture: the pattern of assumptions, ideas, and
beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment
and manage its internal structure.26
22. Attesting to this expectation are the discussion and examples on organization theory given
in Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 16-19.
23. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a routine U-2 mission went ahead as usual,
but the aircraft strayed off-course over the Soviet Union, contributing to tensions that nearly
led to a violent U.S.-Soviet clash. This and other examples are given in Allison, Essence of
Decision, p. 141.
24. Van Evera, "Causes of War," chapter 7, presents a detailed case on how the organizational
dynamics of militaries favor escalation.
25. For an overview of the early evolution of the concept of organizational culture, see William
G. Ouchi and Alan L. Wilkins, "Organizational Culture," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11
(1985), pp. 457-483; more recently see Peter J. Frost, et al., eds., Reframing Organizational Culture
(Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1991). In security studies, the concept of culture has
been applied in different ways. See e.g., Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York:
Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979); Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF
(Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1977); Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National
Style (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press 1986); Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War Analysis (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). Three notable recent studies are Elizabeth Kier, Culture,
Politics, and Military Doctrine: France and Britain Between the Wars (manuscript, January 1993);
Thomas U. Berger, "America's Reluctant Allies: The Genesis of the Political Military Cultures of
Japan and West Germany," Ph.D. diss. (MIT, 1992); Alastair I. Johnston, "An Inquiry into
Strategic Culture: Chinese Strategic Thought, The Para Bellum Paradigm, and Grand Strategic
Choice in Ming China," Ph.D. diss. (University of Michigan, 1993).
26. The definition given here is loosely based on Edward Schein, Organizational Culture and
Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1985), p. 9. Large organizations are rarely
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Organizational culture deserves attention because it has an autonomous
influence on the preferences of military services and ultimately on those of

states. Cultures are not simply reducible to the desires of individuals who
guide organizations, nor to the environmental circumstances in which they

exist. Organizational cultures are more than the individuals that run the
organizations, in two senses. First, culture is a collectively held phenomenon.
It is not generally the reflection of a single leader nor is it some simple
mathematical aggregation of many individual beliefs. Second, instead of
individuals changing cultures, the reverse is usually the case: people are

socialized by the beliefs that dominate the organizations of which they are
part.27 Those who heed the prevailing norms are rewarded and promoted.
Those who do not are given little authority or are fired.28
Cultures are also not mere weathervanes to environmental forces or to

"strategic rationality."29 The number of large companies that have failed to
adapt to market changes are legion.30 Organizational beliefs often determine
which external circumstances get attention and how costs and benefits are
weighed. Cultures act as a heuristic for organizational development, much

the same way a theoretical paradigm can shape intellectual thought. They
provide a limiting lens for interpreting and selecting what is important amidst

uncertainty.31 Environmental data and facts which contradict culture will be

characterized by one culture, but have several. Often, however, especially when the organization
is hierarchically ordered, a dominant culture provides the main creed.
27. One theorist has noted that one "does not live for months or years in a particular position
in an organization, exposed to some streams of communication, shielded from others, without
the most profound effects upon what he knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes,
fears, and proposes." Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press,
1976), p. xvi.

28. For many years, failure to wear a white shirt and dark suit at IBM had hazardous consequences for an employee's career. The company has no written policy on attire. But according
to one former executive, there was "an unwritten dress code that's as effective as if it were
engraved in steel-or as if it had a loaded gun behind it." See F.G. "Buck" Rodgers, The IBM
Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
29. The issue of where culture comes from and how it changes is a broad topic that is generally
outside the scope of this paper. I do, however, provide some evidence below that military
cultures are not simply a product of the strategic circumstances these organizations confront.
For a more extensive discussion of organizational innovation see Barbara Levitt and James G.
March, "Organizational Learning," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 14 (1988), pp. 319-340.
30. Many try to change their cultures by large-scale personnel changes at the top. See Thomas
C. Hayes, "Faltering Companies Seek Outsiders," New York Times, January 18, 1993, pp. Cl and
C4.

31. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Culture and Risk (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982), argue that the risks people face and the ways risks are assessed are a product of
an earlier cultural choice.
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discounted as deviant and will be discarded. Likewise, resources are channeled to methods suited to culture, which consequently appear more feasible

than those deprived of funding and attention.32 Finally, cultures persist for
utilitarian reasons: it can be difficult and expensive to reorient operational
philosophy, especially in a large and complex organization.33

The organizational culture view posits that the pattern of assumptions,

ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a military bureaucracy should conduct
battle will influence state preferences and actions on the use of that means.34
Each service, repeatedly faced with tough decisions about how, where, and

when to employ violence, develops a culture that sets priorities and allocates

resources.35 Where the traditional approach would expect all organizational
activities to be equally likely to result in inadvertent escalation, the cultural
variant contends that accidents and escalation are likely in those means

compatible with beliefs about the "right way" to fight wars. These "para-

digms" provide maps for action that either advocate or ignore specific means
of warfare. Those means compatible with the dominant war-fighting culture
will be developed and advocated by the military. In such areas doctrine,
preparations, and intelligence will be geared towards use, not restraint.
Furthermore, those accidents that do occur will be seized on as proof of
intentional enemy use or of an unavoidable intensification of the war that
must be met in kind or bettered. In those types of warfare that are incom-

patible with the dominant culture, there will be little planning and advocacy

for their use.36 More attention will be given to avoiding accidents; those that
32. This is the "competency trap" where experience with, and sunk costs in, a certain technology
or means make it seem better even if alternatives are actually superior. See Levitt and March,
"Organizational Learning," p. 322.
33. David Kreps asserts that corporate culture, even if some costs are involved, has a beneficial
functional role of facilitating communication and coordination. David M. Kreps, "Corporate
Cultures and Economic Theory," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Schepsle, eds., Perspectives on
Positive Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143.
34. The degree of impact a particular organization will have on executive decisions seems to
vary along at least three dimensions: 1) the extent to which it has monopoly power on issue
expertise; 2) the complexity of its responsibilities; and 3) the time period available for action.
Militaries are particularly influential in wartime because they generally have monopoly control
over expertise on the use of force, military operations are complex and not easily understood
by non-specialists, and time periods for altering pre-arranged plans are limited. For a more
detailed discussion of this topic, see Legro, Cooperation Under Fire.
35. Organizational cultures can be discerned in a variety of sources including interviews, the
memoirs of participants, doctrinal development, organizational correspondence, planning documents, and internal exercises.

36. For example, the traditional viewpoint has difficulty explaining the defensive orientation of
some militaries (e.g., the French Army) in the interwar period. For an excellent analysis of this
issue, see Kier, Culture, Politics, and Military Doctrine.
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do occur will be accepted as such and managed so as to avert an escalation

spiral. In short, the organizational culture perspective predicts a directalbeit subtle-link between military beliefs and customs and the likelihood
of inadvertent escalation.

World War II: Submarines, Bombing, and Chemical Weapons

Each of these perspectives on inadvertent escalation tells a different story of
why states unintentionally cross fire-breaks in the midst of an on-going
conflict. How the four approaches account for the actions of the two main
antagonists of World War 11-Britain and Germany-is examined below in
more detail. The cases deal with three areas of combat-submarine attacks
on non-combatants, the bombing of civilians, and chemical warfare-that

were taboo means of combat during the interwar period. These cases all
occurred within the same conflict, and therefore differences in what was at
stake cannot explain the outcomes. They include both situations where in-

advertent escalation took place as well as when it did not.
These cases involve two aspects of accidents: their origins and their con-

sequences. In the submarine warfare section, the main focus is on origins
and covers three situations that had different outcomes: an accident that

broke a taboo, an accident did not involve taboos, and an "accident waiting
to happen" that was avoided. With regard to strategic bombing and chemical
warfare, the main interest is the consequences of the accidents: why did
some lead to escalation while others did not? I pay more theoretical attention

to organizational culture because it is a newcomer and untested; nonetheless,
evidence for competing explanations is considered, particularly when they

offer a compelling contrasting prediction of the event.

SUBMARINE WARFARE: ACCIDENT VS. NON-EVENT

The submarine in World War II became known as the "viper of the sea" and
its use against merchant and passenger ships was reviled. At the London

Naval Conference of 1930, rules that had been formulated and generally
approved at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference were accepted into
international law. These rules prohibited submarines from sinking merchant

or passenger ships without providing for the safety of the crews and passen-
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gers.37 This hampered the submarine somewhat because it might be vulnerable to aircraft and other ships when heeding the required search and safety
provisions. Nonetheless, all the major powers supported the treaty. Despite
the collapse of other negotiations and agreements, in 1936 the major pow-

ers-including Britain and Germany-reaffirmed their commitment to the
rules in the London Protocol.

A close inspection of three situations of submarine warfare involving Germany and Britain suggests how organizational culture can generate accidents.

The most infamous accident of World War II submarine combat was the
sinking of the passenger liner Athenia by a German U-boat at the start of
hostilities. In the second case, one British submarine sank another, and the

third was a historical non-event: a British submarine adhered to the rules
despite strong incentives to torpedo a German liner. The four approaches
offer different predictions on these cases. Clausewitz's friction thesis would
anticipate an equal likelihood of escalation, given that the situations were

comparable in intensity, complexity, and uncertainty (e.g., clarity of battle
instructions and ability to identify friend or foe). Similarly, traditional orga-

nization theory would also predict escalation in all cases because both navies
had organizational routines torpedoing ships and were eager to join the
fight. Conversely, the security dilemma image would predict no accidental

escalation: the submarines faced neither use-'em-or-lose-'em nor preemption
incentives. That is, they were not put at risk themselves by not attacking but
instead waiting to confirm the identity of the enemy as either combatant or
civilian, as directed by international law.

Organizational culture provides the best explanation in that it correctly
predicts that there would be escalation in Germany where unrestricted attacks were central to naval warfare thinking, but not in Britain where the

Royal Navy belittled the value and threat of anti-trade submarine warfare.
Here is what happened.

GERMANY S SUBMARINE ACCIDENT. When Germany started World War II by
attacking Poland, strict orders had been issued to the U-boats that the war
was to be conducted with meticulous restraint towards merchant and passenger ships in accordance with international agreements. Hitler hoped to

37. Richard Dean Burns, "Regulating Submarine Warfare, 1921-1941: A Case Study in Arms

Control and Limited War," Militany Affairs, Vol. 35 (April 1971), pp. 56-62; Janet Manson,

Diplomatic Ramifications of Unre'stricted Submarine Warfare, 1939-1941 (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1990), pp. 33-52.
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avoid conflict with Britain and America.38 In World War I, unrestricted attacks
by German underwater boats had increased animosities with the former and
led to hostilities with the latter, a development that significantly contributed

to Germany's defeat.39 Hitler hoped to avert a repetition of history and

therefore required restrictions on submarine warfare.
At the start of hostilities, eighteen of Germany's twenty six ocean-going

U-boats had already taken up action stations around the British Isles.40 One of
the submarines was Joseph Lemp's U-30 on patrol 250 miles northwest of
Ireland. On the evening of September 3, 1939, the day Britain declared war,

Lemp located a potential target and identified it as enemy. The vessel was
indeed British, but it was the passenger liner Athenia. The crew aboard the
Athenia knew that war had been declared, but they did not worry about
U-boat attacks because they believed the ship was protected by the London

Protocol.41 Lemp's U-30, however, spit out two torpedoes that burst the
vessel. 1088 passengers took to lifeboats, 112 went to the bottom. The sinking

of the Athenia contributed to the onset of unrestricted submarine warfare.42
How can this incident be explained? It is probable that the "fog of war"
had something to do with it. The young captain Lemp was probably tense

in the face of possible enemy contact and not thinking as clearly as he might
have been. It is unlikely that he purposely blasted a passenger liner. Since

accidents are inherently undesired and are more likely in times of tension

and confusion, it is difficult to "falsify" Clausewitz's friction thesis. Maybe
Lemp just made a mistake. But simply to blame "operator error" is to conflate

human presence with causation.43 We must ask if there was evidence to
suggest that factors other than pure chance under complexity were at work,

38. F.H. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1951), pp.
4-9.
39. Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolationism, 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959), pp. 113-136.

40. Oberkommando des Kriegsmarine, "Chronik des Seekriegs: Heft 1 (1939 and 1940)," Berlin,
PG 32610B, Roll 4078, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NA).
41. Edwin P. Hoyt, Death of the U-Boats (New York: McGraw-Hill Co, 1988), pp. 15-16.

42. Britain claimed that the incident was intentional and implemented its own set of defensive
measures, some of which were violations of the spirit if not the letter of the London Protocol.
German submariners used the British measures to argue to their superiors that they must be
allowed to attack merchant vessels without restrictions. Germany was largely doing so against
Britain by October of 1939, while Britain did not do so against Germany until the spring of 1940.

43. When accidents happen there is a tendency to focus on human error as a cause, rather than
on other underlying causes that would tend to produce incidents regardless of the individual
involved. See Perrow, Normal Accidents, pp. 9, 23-30, 330-331, 339.
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and whether certain predilections tended to push randomness and human
fallibility in a particular direction.
The environment of combat that evening was not particularly suited to

"friction" in the form of Lemp's misidentification. Although Clausewitz had
much more in mind than the weather, the analogy of "fog" does not fit.144
The evening was clear, making misidentification unlikely. Nonetheless, Lemp

claimed that he thought the Athenia was an auxiliary cruiser because it was
zig-zagging and showing no lights, neither of which was true. Furthermore,

Lemp's U-boat closed to such a short distance that it could not easily have
missed the outline of the safety boats and the lack of guns that marked the

ship as a passenger liner.45 Hitler's demand for restraint was also clearly
communicated to the U-boat commanders. The submarines went to sea with

orders to heed the submarine rules, and this order had been repeated at the

very outset of World War 11.46 Finally, there were no strong security dilemma
incentives to escalate: the Nazi submarines were not at risk by avoiding

attacks on non-combatants and would still be able to impair British trade if

they decided to do so at a later time.47 In Lemp's particular case there is no
evidence that he thought the Athenia had detected that his U-boat was in the

area. Thus the source of the U-30's action was not a perceived "us or them"
dilemma as if, for example, the Athenia had been a cruiser that spotted the
U-boat, forcing Lemp to choose to kill or be killed. Neither friction nor the

security dilemma accurately capture the dynamics of the Athenia accident.

44. Clausewitz, On War, p. 120 writes, "One [source of friction], for example, is the weather.
Fog can prevent the enemy from being seen in time, a gun from firing when it should, a report
from reaching the commanding officer. Rain can prevent a battalion from arriving, make another
late by keeping it not three, but eight hours on the march, ruin a cavalry charge by bogging the
horses down in mud, etc."
45. Manson, Diplomatic Ramifications, pp. 64-66 and note 44; Peter Padfield, Donitz: The Last
Fuhrer (London: Golanz Ltd., 1984), p. 191.

46. The orders were laid out to the commanders as they put to sea in August and Donitz
reminded his captains of that order by wire on September 3, 1939. See "Opbefehl Nr. 2 fur UBoote 'Alarmiubung Nordsee' (U27, U30), Kiel 21.8.39," PG32012-NID, NA; Padfield, Donitz,
p. 191.
47. They were more vulnerable by following the rules than by not doing so; however, restraint
was central to Hitler's grand strategy. With immediate unrestricted warfare, the U-boats could
have scored a few easier kills right at the beginning before Britain could organize its convoys
and defensive measures, but no significant strategic advantage was expected from such action.
Germany only had some 26 ocean-going U-boats at the start of war, just one-third of which
could normally be on station at a time. Donitz argued 300 would be needed to get the job done.
See "Gedanken uiber den Aufbau der U-Bootswaffe," Memo by Donitz, September 3, 1939, RM
7/891, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg, Germany (hereafter, BA-MA).
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From an organizational culture perspective, however, the incident is less

puzzling. The culture of the U-boat corps of which Lemp was a part is central

to his subsequent "mistake. "48 To a degree not seen in any other country,
Germany had a vibrant pro-submarine culture within its maritime forces.49
Even though this culture was suppressed for a good part of the interwar

period due to international treaties and internal politics, the submarine ranks
served as a magnet for some of the most ambitious and talented officers in

the Navy. Karl Donitz, commander of the U-boats, sought to infuse his men
with an offensive, anything-is-possible spirit. He led the revival of the World

War I U-boat doctrine based on an anti-trade offensive, one that seemed at
odds with the pledge to adhere to the submarine rules.50
In light of this culture, the Athenia incident is not surprising. Lemp was
zealously implementing his training. Germany's "sea wolves" were first and

foremost taught to be aggressive, and not to miss opportunities.51 The notion
of differentiating attacks was not ingrained in the training of the
U-boat mariners, which is why they had to be given instructions on the eve

of war that explained the procedures for heeding the submarine rules.52 But
Lemp violated the restrictions by sinking the Athenia in a situation where
there was every reason, except organizational predisposition, to show restraint.53

48. In this case, as in others where the military's preferred way of war favors use and escalation,
the distinctions between cultural and traditional organization theory arguments are not discernible and therefore I do not address the latter.
49. Germany also had a strong battleship culture. But the submarine had a respected tradition
and valued role. This contrasts sharply with the interwar experience of countries such as the
United States and Britain, which ignored the underwater boat, despite its potential value in a
war with Japan.

50. Terrence Robertson, Night Raider of the Atlantic (New York: Dutton, 1956), p. 16; Befehlshaber
der Unterseeboat, Kriegstagebuch, September 15, 1939, RM 87/3, BA-MA; Karl Donitz, Memoirs:
Ten Years and Twenty Days, trans. R.H. Stevens (New York: World, 1959), pp. 12-13. Padfield,
Donitz, pp. 158-160.
51. Padfield, Donitz, p. 196.

52. See testimony of Fregattenkapitan Hessler (Donitz's son-in-law) at Nuremburg. Trial of the
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg: Vol. XIII (New York:
AMS Press, 1971), p. 528.
53. One naval staff member advocated giving submarines permission to sink darkened ships
without any warning. Due to the "political situation," the possibility that another incident would
generate international opposition, this could not be completely approved. The suggestion was
made that the Navy leadership give its "silent approval" to attack darkened ships in areas where
only British vessels operated. The one condition was that the submarines had to claim in their
war diaries that any sunken merchant vessels had been mistaken for warships. This is what
Lemp claimed and what Padfield, Donitz, p. 193, says was official Navy policy in such situations.
See "Forderungen des B.d.U. und militarische Moglichkeiten der Durchfiihrung," September
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When news of the Athenia's destruction reached Germany on the day that
Britain declared war, Hitler and Raeder, the head of the Navy, were convinced that it could not have been caused by a German U-boat, given the
aims of the Third Reich and the explicit instructions issued. Only Donitz,
the trainer of the U-boat captains and crews, thought that it might very well
have been one of his captains, despite instructions, who sank the passenger

liner.54 The U-boats' war-fighting dogma meant that such an "accident" could
be expected.
BRITAIN S SUBMARINE ACCIDENT AND NON-EVENT. Britain's behavior in sub-

marine warfare contrasts sharply with that of Germany. The Royal Navy had

dramatically different beliefs about the utility of the submarine. In Britain,
the battleship was considered the "final arbiter" of naval combat and it

dominated the war-fighting culture of the British Navy.55 This culture, embodied in doctrine and plans, belittled submarine warfare, particularly
against commerce. The underwater boat was regarded as the tool of weaker

powers, not of mighty Britain.56 Sight unseen, the submarine could strike
without warning at undefended merchant vessels and even at the proud
warships. Not only was it a threat to the war fleet, but it also required that

warships be engaged in less heady tasks, such as accompanying convoys,
when they otherwise would be seeking battle. The Royal Navy did not train
submariners nor develop boats to attack commerce. Submarines were meant
to be used primarily for intelligence and, when they were lucky enough to
get the opportunity, occasional attacks on enemy warships.57
22, 1939, RM 7/844, BA-MA. Donitz and Wagner testified at Nuremburg that this memo was

written by a staff officer and that the Navy never forwarded such an order.

54. Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals (New York: Dutton, 1949), p. 23. The leaders
did not find out what actually happened until Lemp returned from patrol at the end of the

month.

55. "Final Report of the Post-War Questions Committee," March 27, 1920, ADM 1/8586, Public
Records Office, Kew, UK (PRO) as cited in Stephen W. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars,
Vol. I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London: Collins, 1968), p. 115.
56. The origin of this bias was not simply geo-strategic advantage; i.e. that Britain was an island
power dependent on sea trade confronting Germany, a continental state that was less vulnerable
to sea interdiction. After all, the Royal Navy's main expected opponent until the late 1930s was
Japan, a country very vulnerable to an anti-commerce campaign. Nonetheless, despite the fact
that the UK did not have and could not afford the battleships to take on Japan in the Pacific,
the Navy did not seriously consider using cheaper submarines to blockade the island.
57. The British believed that the submarine was not a threat to battleships because U-boats
would be detected with the sonar device called "ASDIC." But because of the cultural bias
stressing the inferiority of submarines, ASDIC did not receive adequate critical testing and its
flaws were not appreciated. David Henry, "'British Submarine Development and Policy, 1918-

1939," Ph.D. War Studies (King~s College, University of London, 1976); on ASDIC see pp. 320-

321.
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The influence of culture on unintended British actions is especially appar-

ent when contrasted with the German navy's actions. As with Germany and
the Athenia incident, the first submarine attack by Britain was also an acci-

dent. On September 10, 1939, the Triton mistakenly torpedoed another En-

glish submarine, Oxely.58 Like the U-30, the Triton was acting in accordance
with its organizational culture. Each inadvertently destroyed a ship, but it
was the type of vessel each had been trained to attack. British submarines

had a legacy of successful anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in World War 1.59
In comparison, German strategy was based on an anti-merchant offensive.
This difference appears to have been reflected even in the physical structure

of the submarines. The acoustical detection array in German U-boats was
designed for an anti-shipping role, while in British submarines it was for
attacking other underwater boats.60 From an organizational culture viewpoint
it is not surprising that the first "accident" of the war for a British ship was
the destruction of a friendly submarine, while Lemp's error was an "out of
bounds" passenger liner.

The difference between Britain and Germany is just as evident in the
accidents that did not happen. British submarines incurred no Athenia inci-

dent despite opportunities.61 For example, when the British submarine
Salmon sighted the German passenger liner Bremen 2000 yards away on
December 12, 1939, a replay of the incident involving the Athenia (which had

been only 800 yards from the U-boat) seemed likely. Yet the Salmon surfaced

and ordered the ship to stop for the search and seizure procedures that were
mandated by international law. Unexpectedly, however, a Luftwaffe plane

appeared and chased the submarine off.62 Ironically, the Bremen was being
used as a troopship at the time and therefore was a legitimate target, which

58. The story of this incident is told in A.S. Evans, Beneath the Waves: A History of H.M. Submarin

Losses (London: William Kinder, 1986), pp. 195-199.

59. The day before the Oxely was destroyed, Admiral Watson, the commander of the submarine
force, requested that his boats be used more in an ASW role. "The Use of Submarines in Defence
of our Trade in the Atlantic," From RA(S) to Secretary of the Admiralty, September 9, 1939,

ADM 199/1920, PRO.

60. Rear Admiral G.W.G. Simpson, Periscope View (London: Macmillan London Ltd., 1972),

p. 61.

61. The British surface fleet did clear much of the German commerce from the seas at the

beginning of the conflict.

62. The captain of the Salmon noted, "I had no special instructions with reference to intercepting
Bremen and considered myself bound by international law, a rigid adherence to which had been
specifically stressed to submarine commanding officers at the beginning of war." See "HMS
Salmon Patrol Report December 2-16, 1939," Memo from Commanding Officer HMS Salmon to
Captain (S) Third Submarine Flotilla, ADM 199/288, PRO.
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the Salmon could have easily torpedoed from the safety of the ocean depths.63

The difference between Britain's and Germany's accidents is inexplicable

from a traditional organizational perspective. Both navies had adopted the
London Protocol as part of their organizational rules, but beliefs on how to

fight a war-and the types of accidents that occurred-diverged. As a cultural
approach expects, Britain's behavior reinforced its restraint, while Germany's
provoked an accident that violated taboos.

STRATEGIC BOMBING: VIOLATIONS IGNORED OR RECIPROCATED

From 20,000 feet off the ground, the familiar surroundings of life-buildings,
homes, cars-appear unnaturally small. Perhaps this perspective eased the
task of the young aviators of World War II who were ordered to flatten the
homes and habitations of enemy civilians hundreds of miles behind the front
lines. Although this practice became commonplace during World War II (and
in many conflicts since), in the 1920s and 1930s it was considered barbaric

and potentially avoidable. Statesmen made considerable efforts both to re-

duce air armaments and to find ways to regulate air attacks by agreeing on

rules and restrictions.64 The main distinction they hoped to enforce was that
between civilians and combatants. No official treaties were concluded, but
Britain and Germany were able to reach accord at the beginning of the war

to avoid bombing undefended civilians and cities.65 That pact retained legitimacy for the first nine months of conflict, but as we will see, it did not
survive the war.

In the strategic bombing cases, organizational culture played the pivotal
part, not necessarily by causing accidents as in the submarine cases above,

but instead by affecting the responses of states to the incidents-i.e., either
to use accidents as justification for escalation or, by ignoring them, to reaffirm
restraint. Consider, for example, the difference in the responses of Germany
and of Britain to the other side's transgression of a major limitation in the
air war. In one case, Britain's bombing of the German homeland brought no
63. Nigel John Gilbert, "British Submarine Operations in WWII," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 89 (March 1963), p. 73.
64. These were serious efforts. Britain even considered giving up her most effective means of
sea warfare, the sea blockade, in exchange for restrictions on air warfare. See especially C.I.D.
Limitation of Arms Sub-Committee, 2nd Meeting, July 18, 1938, in "Humanization of Air
Warfare," AIR 9/202, PRO.
65. Those participating directly in the war effort were generally seen as legitimate targets of air

power. J.M. Spaight, Air Powe&- and War Rights, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1947),
pp. 43, 259.
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comparable response; Germany virtually ignored the event. Yet when Ger-

many accidentally transgressed a second limitation on the bombing of capital
cities later in the war, Britain responded immediately. How can these different outcomes be understood?

Organizational culture predicts correctly that Britain and Germany had
different ways of warfare that accorded different importance to a strategic

offensive aimed at civilians. That contrast had a considerable impact on
decision making and events. The other perspectives are less precise in their
predictions. The friction hypothesis would anticipate escalation from both
participants, particularly in light of the technical complexities of navigation
and precision bombing in the early war period. Likewise, traditional organization theory would also expect both to escalate since both the RAF and

Luftwaffe had organizational capabilities and plans for strategic bombing.
The security dilemma argument expects similar behavior from the opponents,

but in the opposite direction, toward restraint: there was not a strong surprise-attack or preemptive incentive to initiate strategic bombing since no

single attack could cause a devastating amount of damage, and there were
few penalties involved in continuing restraint to ascertain if the enemy had
actually-even if accidentally-violated restrictions. Yet while Germany
showed restraint, Britain escalated.
GERMANY S RESPONSE TO BRITAIN S FIRST ATTACKS. On the night of May 11-

12, 1940, RAF bombers undertook, possibly accidentally, the first strategic
raid of the war in an attack on Monchen-Gladbach in Germany. Another

RAF assault on Aachen and Monchen-Gladbach took place on May 14-15.66
The official go-ahead for the RAF strategic offensive was given on May 15.
What is of interest here is the German response: there was none. The Germans undertook no immediate retaliation, in kind or otherwise, against
Britain, neither for the earlier, possibly accidental, raids, nor in response to
the approved offensive after May 15. The British history of the Luftwaffe
points out that in the entire 1940 Western campaign through the fall of France,

66. Because the Cabinet was debating on a daily basis whether to undertake these raids, H.W.
Koch, "The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany: The Early Phase, May-September 1940,"
The Historical Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1991), p. 127, has speculated that Bomber Command acted
on its own authority. The evidence, however, is not conclusive. The fact that little irritation was
expressed at the Cabinet meeting on May 15 when the Secretary of State for Air mentioned the
May 14-15 raids suggests that, at least by that date, some sort of limited operation was approved.
See W.M. (40) 123, Conclusions, Minute 2, May 15, 1940, CAB 65/13, PRO; Martin Middlebrook
and Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries: An Operational Reference Book 1939-1945,
p. 42.
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German bombers were not used strategically, except during one four-day
period in June when they attacked the French aircraft industry in Paris and

fuel dumps in Marseilles.67 The Nazis were, of course, aware of the RAF's
attacks as was noted in reports by the security service of the SS.68 Hitler
himself allegedly dismissed the raids at one point as inadvertent. He assumed

that the attacks on German territory were the result of someone losing his
head due to the pressure of the Battle of France, or that the RAF had acted

on its own. He saw no need to retaliate in kind.69 Despite the fact that it had
been made clear that its restraint was contingent on reciprocity, Germany

simply ignored the British actions. Why did reciprocal escalation not occur
immediately?

A pivotal factor in this restraint was the organizational culture of the

Luftwaffe. Unlike the RAF, Luftwaffe faith in strategic bombing-particularly
in a civilian-targeted morale bombing campaign-never took hold. Germany's strategic culture, of which the Luftwaffe was a part, was land-oriented and heavily influenced by a traditional army outlook. Like the RAF,
the Luftwaffe was an independent service in the sense that it was organizationally separate from the Army and Navy and not subordinate to their

orders. Nonetheless, cultures often run deeper than formal structures and

the Luftwaffe was constrained by Germany's continental orientation to combat. The German Air Force did not prepare equipment or plans to wage the
type of large-scale air assault required for bombing and particularly for an

unrestricted campaign. Instead, doctrine was oriented more towards sup-

porting the land battle.70 Even the German heavy bombers best suited for

67. British Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945 (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1983 ed.), p. 72. There is, however, a debate on whether the prior German
attacks on Warsaw and Rotterdam were against "defended" cities and thus permissible or were
instead simply illegitimate terror raids. E.g., see Olaf Groehler, "The Strategic Air War and its
Impact on the German Civilian Population," pp. 282-283; cf. Horst Boog, "The Luftwaffe and
Indiscriminate Bombing up to 1942," p. 386, in Horst Boog, ed., The Conduct of the Air War in
the Second World War: An International Comparison (New York: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1992).
68. See Koch, "The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany," p. 127.
69. As reported by General Warlimont to Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1960), p. 113.

70. Williamson Murray, The Luftwaffe (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of Amer
ica, 1985), esp. pp. 1-23, argues that Germany did have a strategic bomber emphasis. My view

is that while a strategic mission-oriented sub-culture certainly remained a part of the Luftwaffe,
it did not take root and dominate the organization as in Britain. German planning and operations
consistently listed the hierarchy of Luftwaffe's aims as: 1) the destruction of enemy airpower;
then 2) support of the Army and Navy; and finally 3) tasks which might be considered strategic

bombing. See "Instructions of the Commander of the Air Force for the Conduct of Operations
in the Initial Period of War," November 18, 1935, as reprinted in Karl-Heinz V6lker, Dokumente
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strategic bombing were required to have dive-bombing capabilities, a speci-

fication that hindered their strategic bombing effectiveness.71 Thus when
Britain's bombs fell on the Ruhr in the spring of 1940, Germany ignored
them. The Luftwaffe was absorbed fulfilling its established role of helping
the ground forces advance in assault on France. Even when France was

defeated and the Luftwaffe was no longer occupied with its part in that
victory, German restraint in strategic bombing endured.72
BRITAIN S RESPONSE TO GERMANY S ACCIDENTAL RAID ON LONDON. Compare

the German reaction to escalation with the British response to an accidental
German raid that appeared to breach the restraint still in effect on bombing
capital cities. On the night of August 24, 1940, twelve German bombers

overshot their intended targets consisting of aircraft factories and oil refineries located at Rochester and Thameshaven, twenty miles east of London.
Instead they dropped their loads on London, setting off a chain of reprisals
that ended any hope for restraint in strategic bombing in the Second World
War.73
Britain did not ignore the event as Germany had done in Britain's bombing,
but instead seized on it as an act that required response in kind. The next

day Churchill called for retaliation and some 100 bombers were dispatched
against Berlin. Webster and Frankland's Strategic Air Offensive explains that
escalation was motivated by the prime minister's desire that "the Germans
get as good as they were giving. "74 Perhaps in the heat of battle (with its

und Dokumnentarfotos zur Geschichte der Deutschen Luftwaffe (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Ansta

1968), esp. p. 478; "Aufmarsch- und Kampfanweisungen der Luftwaffe: Weisungen fur den
Einsatz gegen Osten," May 1939, RL 2 II/ 21, BA-MA; Fuhrer War Directive No. 16, "Preparations
for a Landing Operation Against England," July 16, 1940.
71. Richard J. Overy, "From 'Uralbomber' to 'Amerikabomber': The Luftwaffe and Strategic
Bombing," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (September 1978), pp. 168-169; Edward L.

Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-1
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), pp. 63-68.
72. Strategic rationality partially accounts for this decision: Hitler sought a peace with Britain
so that he could turn his forces toward the East. But this does not explain why, even after it
became clear in July of 1940 that Britain would not yield and Germany would have to fight, the
Luftwaffe's assignment was first to defeat the RAF, then to assist the army and navy in an
invasion. Terror bombing was to be used only in retaliation.
73. Koch, "The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany," p. 137; Boog, "The Luftwaffe and
Indiscriminate Bombing to 1942," p. 389. The Fuhrer was enraged that his orders had been
disregarded, even if it was an accident. As punishment, the bomber crews responsible were
sent to the infantry. This punishment contrasts sharply with the minimal rebuke that Lemp

received for violating the submarine rules by torpedoing the Athenia. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaff
War Diaries (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 172.
74. Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, 1939-1945 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1961), p. 152.
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attendant "fog"), Churchill simply did not understand that the German action
was inadvertent. There is evidence to suggest, however, that Churchill was

aware that this was an accident and was looking for an excuse to start city

bombing. Britain may have known from intercepted messages that Hitler
had forbidden the Luftwaffe to bomb London.75 Yet even without such
intelligence, there was good reason to suspect an accident. The unintended

foray involved twelve planes which caused light damage and only four

fatalities, hardly the type of decisive operation to be expected from a purposeful breach of this important limitation.76 Churchill himself had earlier
downplayed the gravity of the German raids, noting that very few people

were affected by any one attack.77 Moreover, in July, well before the German
assault, Churchill had already shown an interest in bombing Berlin. At that
time he expressed interest in being able to respond to German attacks on

London. But he also gave a planning date of September 1, suggesting that
his intentions were not necessarily dependent on German actions.78
Why did Britain decide to escalate, breaking the last taboo against strategic
bombing? This is a question of considerable historical controversy and not
one easily answered with the evidence available. While there are many
arguments about what motivated Churchill (not the least of which was his
personal predilection to seize the initiative), what is clear is that his outlook

and options were influenced by RAF culture.79 From the end of World War

75. David Irving, Churchill's War: The Struggle for Power (Australia: Veritas Publishing Co. 1987),
p. 365, especially note 30. This information is based on an interview with R.V. Jones that is not
corroborated. However, it is not unthinkable that such knowledge was gleaned from intercepts
of the signals traffic of the Luftwaffe. See F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World
War, Volume I: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1979), pp. 179-182.

76. Harvey B. Tress, British Strategic Bombing Policy Through 1940: Politics, Attitudes, and the
Formation of a Lasting Pattern (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), p. 68.
77. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VI: Finest Hour, 1939-1941 (London: Heinemann,
1983), pp. 602-603.

78. Minute to Secretary of State for Air and CAS from Prime Minister, July 20, 1940, AIR 19/
458, PRO; Minute from Director Home Office and CAS, July 21, 1940, AIR 19/458, PRO. Churchill
also noted the desirability of waiting, in case of the need to target Berlin, for longer nights and
the arrival of the new Stirling bombers. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VI, p. 673. Churchill
invited Portal, the head of Bomber Command, to his country home to discuss the idea on July
20 and August 17. See Irving, Churchill's War, pp. 371, 403.

79. George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy (New
York: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 117-118, suggests a strategic rationale for escalation. At
the time, Fighter Command was under pressure due to Luftwaffe attacks. Churchill recognized
that command of the air was the key to Britain's defense: if Fighter Command failed, Britain
was lost. Thus to buy Fighter'Command breathing room, it is argued, Churchill purposely
attacked Berlin in order to draw the Luftwaffe's attacks on the British capital and away from
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I, Britain's Air Force had promoted and institutionalized a philosophy of
strategic bombing, whose central tenets were that the best way either to
prevent or to win a war would be to threaten or launch a massive assault on
the enemy's sources of power. This included both depriving the enemy of

the physical means to fight and breaking its morale to continue the battle.

Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), had no doubt about which
was more important: "The moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to

the material effect in a proportion of 20 to 1."8? This philosophy, effectively

cultivated in the organization, was well-suited to unrestricted warfare. A
The RAF's preferences made themselves felt in a number of ways. Air
Force officials had been directly lobbying for escalation since the invasion of
France, arguing that the battle had to be taken to the German homeland.

RAF Intelligence boldly asserted that large "moral effects" were resulting
from its bombing operations, a conclusion that seems to have been driven
more by wishful thinking than objective evidence. Influenced by these ar-

guments, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) concluded on May 25, 1940, that Germany
might be beaten by economic pressure, the bombing of economic and psy-

chological targets, and the instigation of popular revolt in German-occupied
territories. By late June, Churchill had picked up on this thinking, arguing

that airpower would cause Hitler "possibly decisive difficulties" in Germany

and other areas he had to feed and defend.82 On July 8 he asserted: "There
is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down and that is an

absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from

the RAF. This thesis seems plausible with hindsight because it reflects what actually resulted.
Yet direct evidence to support it is sparse. In addition, as Frederick M. Sallagar, The Road to
Total War (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969), pp. 181-182, has noted, the decision
was made at a time, August 24, when Fighter Command was not in terrible shape as it would
be two weeks later.
80. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, pp. 46, 55; Neville Jones, The Beginnings
of Strategic Air Power: A History of the British Bomber Force, 1923-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1987),

p. 34.

81. One way the culture spread was through the selection of personnel. Trenchard was known
to have kept on only those officers who agreed with him. Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals
in Britain: 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1966), p. 200. Perhaps
more important, institutions were founded that would propagate the bomber offensive philosophy, including an air force staff college, a cadet college, technical training schools and other
facilities.

82. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, pp. 145-146; Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill,
Vol. VI, p. 603. On the general issue of RAF bias in intelligence see Harold L. Wilensky,
Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York: Basic B
1967), pp. 24-28.
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this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm them
by this means, without which I do not see a way through."83
The organizational culture view suggests that Churchill's views and choices

were a consequence, not a cause, of organizational planning. His opinion of
the utility of bombing had evolved from a pre-war history of opposition to,

and lack of faith in, the independent strategic air offensive aimed at morale. 84
In May when he became prime minister, Churchill was particularly exposed

to the organizational lobbying on the few air plans available. Perhaps more
important, the situation and RAF culture constrained the options available
to Churchill: Britain was most prepared to strike out at Germany through

strategic bombing.85 Given the RAF's military advice, the interpretation of
events, and the limited capabilities available (strategic area bombing),
Churchill's choice of strategic bombing is largely explained by a cultural
perspective. Without the RAF's bomber culture, Churchill might well have

shared Hitler's disposition against unrestricted air operations. The difference
in the compatibility of each side's air force culture with strategic bombing

explains why Britain and Germany had opposite responses to incidents that
violated restrictions on the use of aerial force.

CHEMICAL WARFARE: BARKING DOGS SILENCED

Like submarine warfare and strategic bombing, chemical warfare (CW) was

a forbidden tool of conflict during the interwar years. The limitation of CW
83. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VI, pp. 655-656. At about the same time (July 17), Portal,
the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of Bomber Command, personally advocated unleashing the
bomber offensive. RAF Narrative, The RAF in the Bombing Offensive Against Germany: Volume II,
Restricted Bombing September 1939 to May 1941 (Air History Branch, Air Ministry), AIR 41/40,
p. 117, AIR 41/40, PRO.

84. At the end of World War I, Churchill doubted that victory could be had by terrorizing
civilians. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, p. 47. In the 1930s, Churchill
advocated air defenses as a means of mitigating air attacks. He did not believe the "bomber
would always get through." See Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1948), pp. 147-152; Tress, British Strategic Bombing, pp. 69-70. In September 1939,
citing the results of the Spanish Civil War, Churchill doubted that "the essential elements of
war" would be changed by the air arm. On May 7, 1940, Churchill had opposed unrestricted
bombing because of Britain's perceived inferiority to Germany in air power. See W.M. (40) 114,
Conclusions, Minute 1, May 7, 1940, CAB 65/13, PRO. After September 1940, Churchill varied
between doubt and support for the air offensive. See Maxwell Philip Schoenfeld, The War
Ministry of Winston Churchill (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1972), pp. 92-101.
85. But Britain's air power resources could also have been used to attack Germany's invasion
effort or help with the battle at sea. See Tress, British Strategic Bombing Policy, pp. 215-220. On
the uses of air power in the Battle of the Atlantic, see Williamson Murray, "The Influence of
Pre-War Anglo-American Doctrine on the Air Campaigns of the Second World War," in Boog,
ed., The Conduct of the Air War, pp. 245-246.
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was discussed at many of the negotiations of that era. But only one treatythe Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting first use of chemical weapons-was
signed. At the beginning of World War II, Britain and Germany exchanged
pledges reaffirming their no-first-use commitments. Despite these agreements, nations expected CW use and went to considerable efforts preparing

for such combat. CW was widely recognized by all participants in World
War II to have significant military utility.86 However, throughout the war,
even though a range of CW accidents occurred, they never led to escalation.

The friction, traditional organization, and security dilemma perspectives
all would predict a spiral of use from restricted weapons even if by accident.
Intense conflict, complex operations, and great uncertainty characterized
many of the situations where CW incidents occurred. These sources of fric-

tion helped cause accidents, but did not cause escalation. All of the military
organizations involved also had plans, troops, and weapons for CW use but,
contrary to traditional organization theory, their routines did not generate
escalation. According to the security dilemma argument, both sides should

have felt insecure due to the surprise-attack advantage of CW, should have
been poised to strike back to minimize disadvantage, and should have been
leery of any type of trust in enemy restraint. It was widely acknowledged
that gas was most effectively used in a surprise attack. For example, General

Ochsner, the head of German CW in World War II, argued that where
attacker and defender are equally well prepared, the attacker has the advantage because of ability to complete preparations, achieve surprise, and choose

86. This is evident in the analysis and calculations of individual countries and outside experts.
For example, in Britain a 1939 review of gas requirements concluded that "with added and
improved weapons chemical troops will be used in a future war more than they were in the
last." See "Gases for Use in the Field and the Quantity of Each Required," prepared by the
Director of Military Training and Director of Staff Studies by request of the Intra-service Committee on Anglo-French Chemical Warfare Conversations, July 7, 1939, War Office 193/740, PRO.
From December 1939 tests, the British concluded that, "we have at our disposal a potential
weapon of great value." See "Chemical Warfare-High Spray Trials," from MO1 to DDMO,
January 30, 1940, WO 193/726, PRO. Military intellectuals such as B.H. Liddell Hart and J.F.C.
Fuller were also proponents of CW.
87. Gas was not, however, a use-it-or-lose-it weapon, nor was CW just an "offensive" weapon.
It could be used for both offense and defense. Generally it was seen as benefiting those interested
in inhibiting fast moving operations after it had been introduced to the battlefield. But initial
use could facilitate an offensive by opening wide gaps in enemy lines, as was the case with
Germany's first use of CW in World War I. British planners in World War II argued that CW
might be effective in breaking through enemy lines if the offensive towards Germany were
stalled in Italy or France. See Joint Planning Staff Memorandum, "Military Considerations
Affecting the Initiation of Chemical and Other Special Forms of Warfare," July 27, 1944, PREM
3/89, PRO.
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the time, place and scale of attack. The defender would be hard pressed to
keep defenses ready and would have to fight under the most unfavorable

conditions.88 Inadvertent escalation would seem likely in these circumstances. However, the history of incidents involving chemical warfare in

World War II-that is, its non-use-challenges this notion. The organizational
culture approach argues that both Germany and Britain had "ways of war"

that worked to suppress inadvertent escalation. Indeed, that is what we find.
BRITAIN AND THE ABSENCE OF CW INADVERTENCE. Of the armed forces of

Britain affiliated with chemical warfare, none found it a desirable weapon,
and organizational routines for its use were not accorded the attention and

funding other areas received. Given their prevailing orthodoxy of war-fighting, this is not surprising. In the Army, chemical warfare development was

relatively ignored for three reasons. First, the legacy of gas use in World War
I had alienated mainstream officers to this form of warfare. They did not like

the interference of civilian chemists, the special privileges accorded to the
companies that were tasked to wage CW, and the way that gas complicated

the traditional battlefield. Second, the Army's conservative approach to innovation worked against the acceptance of chemical weapons. The Army

was but a loose collection of traditional regiments, like sports or social clubs,
that soldiers relished as a refuge from social and technological change. Within
this system, the technical or mechanical officer was looked down upon. Gas
was a technical weapon. The Director of Artillery was left in charge of
chemical warfare, yet artillerymen seemed more concerned with their horses
than with their technical equipment. Finally, the Army had few resources
and no central war scenario. This inhibited development of weapons like
CW that were affected by the specific geographical and climatological conditions of the area in which they would be used.89

88. Lt. General Herman Ochsner, History of German Chemical Warfare in World War II, Part I: The
Military Aspect, P-004a (Historical Office of the Chief of the [U.S.] Chemical Corps, 1949), p. 4,
NA.

89. See L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986), pp. 269, 273; J.B.S. Haldane, Callinicus: A Defense of Chemical Warfare (New York:
Dutton, 1925), pp. 34 and 37; Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 35-71, 132; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham,
Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1982); chapter 9, and p. 180; and M.M. Postan, D. Hay, and J.D. Scott, Design and Development
of Weapons (London: HMSO, 1964) pp. 238-240, 253. It was recognized that the effect of CW

depended on local weather arid geographic conditions. See CID, "Chemical Warfare Policy,"
November 1924, p. 15, WO 188/144, PRO.

International Security 18:4 1 134

RAF thinking was more compatible with gas use yet CW development was
in the hands of the Army and it received little attention or advocacy in the
Air Ministry. The RAF recognized a potential role for CW, but when it

appeared that CW development would reduce funding for more preferred
tools, such as bombing with high explosives and incendiaries, the RAF was

willing to forgo the option.90 The individuals that did advocate CW were

censured by higher authorities.9' In wartime, and specifically in the decisions
of 1944, the COS, led by the RAF, did not want their high-explosive and
incendiary bombing loads cut in favor of gas. The former, they argued, were
well-tried and known to be effective. Although the bomber offensive was
not working as intended, the blinders of RAF culture inhibited Britain from

seeing this.92
This cultural aversion to CW was reflected in the British military's strong
interest in avoiding its use. This is a dynamic unanticipated by traditional

organizational theory, which expects that militaries in war tend to foster

escalation.93 Yet in several instances, incidents that could have led to CW
escalation were ignored or purposefully suppressed. The first was in late
1940 when the War Office received reports from the Middle East that Italy
was preparing to use gas in Ethiopia. The Commander-in-Chief of Middle
East Forces suggested that a threat of retaliation in kind be made to deter it.
The War Office quashed the suggestion, fearing that giving attention to cases
of possible use without actually retaliating (there was doubt Britain could or
would) might indicate to Germany that the UK feared a gas war, and thus

encourage the Nazis to use it. It was decided that should the Italians employ

90. Also see CID, "The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use in War," Memorandum by the War
Office and Air Staff, July 26, 1938, CAB 4/28, PRO. Paul Harris, "British Preparations for
Offensive Chemical Warfare, 1935-1939," Royal United Services Institute Journal, Vol. 125, No. 2
(June 1980), p. 61. For a similar assessment during the war, see CAS to the COS, "Chemical
Warfare," November 14, 1941, WO 193/711, PRO.
91. In 1942, Hugh Dowding, CINC of Fighter Command, wrote in a draft of an article that
"mustard gas should be used in an air attack on Germany." But this view was not approved by
the COS and he had to delete it. This was noted in a letter from Dowding to Basil Liddell-Hart.
See B.H. Reid, "Gas Warfare: The Perils of Prediction," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf,
eds., Reassessing Arms Control (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 153.
92. See F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. III, Part I (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988); pp. 298-307; Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, pp. 24-28.
93. This is particularly true in forms of warfare that already have well-developed routines and
that are non-innovative. CW fit both of these categories. Britain had prepared to use it and had
already done so extensively in World War I; thus its use was not innovative. In fact, of the three
means of warfare, strategic bombing was the most radical change from conflict in World War I.
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gas, the whole matter would be swept under the rug: "Publicity should not
(repeat not) be given to the fact."94

The same phenomenon happened in 1942 with respect to reports from the
Far East that left little doubt that Japan was using gas in China. The Army

thought that it was best to ignore this use since any British retaliation might
lead to unrestricted Japanese CW in India, an area that was considered

vulnerable to gas attacks.95 This was a strategic calculation, but one that was

defined by a culture hostile to CW use. For even when strategic circumstances
changed, when India was not at risk in 1944, the COS still refused to accept

the evidence that the Japanese had used gas.96
In another example, when the Soviets became worried in the winter of
1942 that the Germans were readying to unleash a gas war, Stalin asked

Churchill for help. This was given in the form of a pledge: If the Germans
used CW against the Russians, the Allies would use CW against the Nazis.

This idea threw the British military into frenzy. The COS felt the promise
might lead to immediate chemical warfare. Many were especially upset because the United Kingdom had no means to verify whether Soviet claims of
German use were actually true.97
A final incident occurred during the German bombing of Bari Harbor in
Italy in December 1943. One of the Luftwaffe bombs hit a U.S. supply ship,

the S.S. John Harvey, that was carrying 2,000 100-lb. mustard bombs to be
used in case CW escalated. The gas was released into the harbor where many
sailors ended up in the water during the raid. Clouds of the toxic agent
drifted over the town. Some 1,000 civilians, as well as soldiers, were killed
at Bari, many from the contaminated water and air. In contrast to Britain's
reaction to the accidental bombing of London, the Allies did not propagandize the event or use it as an excuse for retaliation, but instead covered it
up. Medical reports of wounds were allowed to describe chemical weapon
injuries only in general terms, and strict censorship was instituted at all

military bases. When it was clear that the accident could not be kept secret,
the Combined Chiefs of Staff prepared a statement which reiterated that
"Allied policy is not (repeat not) to use gas unless or until the enemy does

94. Telegram from the War Office to the CINC Middle East, December 16, 1940, WO 193/721,
PRO; "Chemical Warfare: Use of Gas by Italians and Policy for Retaliation," WO 193/725, PRO.
95. "Japanese Gas Warfare in China," July 14, 1942, WO 193/723, PRO.

96. Ismay (for COS) to PM, June 28, 1944,. PREM 3/89, PRO.
97. 11th Meeting of the Defence Committee, April 17, 1942, WO 193/711, PRO.
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so first but that we are fully prepared to retaliate and do not deny the
accident, which was a calculated risk."98
GERMANY AND THE LACK OF INADVERTENT CW. German military culture was

no more favorable to gas than was Britain's and the effect of unintended
incidents on escalation was the same: restraint endured. Dating back to

Moltke, German military thought focused on fast, decisive maneuver and
encirclement as a means of victory. In World War I, a skeptical military was
convinced to try gas based on the argument that it would break the stalemate
of trench warfare.99 It did not. In fact it turned out to be a poor fit with
Germany's desired operations in World War I because it inhibited mobility
and impeded the aggressiveness of soldiers. In addition it led to civilian
interference in military affairs, particularly by officially sanctioned chemists. '00

German doctrine on the eve of World War II was decidedly offensive: fastmoving and long-range armored and motorized units would spearhead the
attack, break through the enemy's front, penetrate quickly and deeply into
the rear, counter enemy efforts to block encirclement or escape, and sever
communications, supply, and command lines. Infantry divisions would then
move in for annihilation battle from the front. Chemical weapons, which
were cumbersome, could play only a limited role in such a strategy. CW
equipment and munitions would jam supply lines, and chemical casualties
were difficult to handle: they did not die easily and needed intensive care.
This was particularly true since the use of gas in offensive operations would
have demanded centralized control which clashed with the decentralized

German auftragstaktik system.'0'
For reasons that differ from Britain's-Germany's later defensive stance,
the threat to its survival, and the mercurial nature of Hitler, who ignored
many norms of state behavior-it may seem surprising that the Reich did

98. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical

Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 119-123.

99. Robert M. Citino, The Evolution of Blitzkrieg Tactics: Germany Defends Itself Against Poland,
1918-1933 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 81; Matthew Cooper, The German Army
1933-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1978) pp. 139-140; Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A
Study in Restraints (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 5.
100. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud, p. 269, 273. Some of the reasons for the poor fit between
culture and CW in Germany, as in Britain, are related to factors that traditional organizational
theorists would stress (for example, a bias towards offense and autonomy), but the outcomerestraint-does not fit the predictions of the traditional school.

101. Ochsner, The History of German CW, p. 5; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
[SIPRI], The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons (New

York: Humanities Press, 1971), p. 307.
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not reflexively lapse into CW use. Coupled with security dilemma considerations, such as surprise-use advantages, it is even more curious why there
was no accidental escalation. Yet from a military culture perspective, the lack

of escalation is not a puzzle.
During Germany's invasion of Poland, mustard gas was used in the Polish

defense of the Jaslo bridge, resulting in several German casualties and deaths.
Instead of responding in kind, however, the Third Reich's military assumed

that the Polish Supreme Command had not ordered the use of gas. They
were right, but the choice seemed more a product of hopeful expectation

than shrewd analysis.'02 The benign assumption that the Germans made in
this situation, that the gas use was not intentional, contrasts sharply with
what Britain concluded about the Luftwaffe raid on London, or Lemp's
judgment on the status of the Athenia. When the German Foreign Ministry

wanted to use the incident for propaganda, General Halder was quick to

squelch the idea. It appears that he, like his British counterparts, was afraid
it might lead to the initiation of CW.103

A second incident in July 1941 testifies to the unusual efforts some states

went to in hopes of avoiding escalation in certain areas. The Soviet Union

claimed that Germany was getting ready to use chemical weapons. This
accusation was based on the capture of a German manual on the offensive

use of gas. In response, Germany was quick to announce through its official
news agency that the manual was merely a training guide, allowed by the

Geneva Protocol, and not an imminent plan.'04 That same summer, German
military leaders had received five reports from the field that the Soviets had
used chemical weapons. One involved a bomber, two were artillery attacks
and two were armored vehicle assaults. The Germans decided that not
enough "objective" evidence existed that the attacks had occurred. But since

twelve German soldiers had mustard gas wounds, it was conceded that
perhaps a single gas bomb had been dropped. Otherwise, however, the

incident was ignored.'05

102. Ochsner states that this finding was "a great relief to us." Ochsner, The History of German

CW, p. 16.

103. "Pressepropaganda Gelbkreuzgasverwendung durch die polnischen Truppen," September

23, 1939, RW 5/v.346, BA-MA.

104. But, "if the Soviets use the discovery of German instructions about gas as an excuse to
begin gas warfare, Germany will answer appropriately." "Abschrift. Auszug aus der Times vom
26 July 1941," RW 5/v. 346, BA-MA.

105. See Armeeoberkommandd 11 an Oberkommando des Heeres, July 1, 1941, RW 5/v. 346,
BA-MA, for a list and description of the injured soldiers. For the analysis of the incidents see
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Another provocative accident occurred during the Allied invasion of Italy
at Anzio in 1943. A German shell struck an Allied weapons depot containing
chemical munitions. The explosion released a cloud of gas that drifted towards the German lines. The Allied commander was quick to notify his
German counterpart that this release of gas was strictly inadvertent. The

German officer accepted the explanation despite his disadvantage had the

Allied officer been lying.'06
Even at the end of the war, when the Germans faced imminent political
extinction and the Allies feared desperate escalation, there was no last resort
to CW in the confusing, threatening, frenzied disintegration of the Third
Reich. In fact, Germany became particularly cautious about unauthorized
use. Supplies were ordered moved, not destroyed, so as to avoid any event

that might give the enemy a pretext for CW use.'07 Chemical stocks and
factories were given top priority in the allocation of scarce transport space.
Despite precautions, on April 18, 1945, an accident at a chemical depot in
central Germany led to the contamination of the surrounding twenty kilometers. The Wehrmacht anticipated that the enemy might point to such an
incident as an excuse for initiating deliberate use of CW and it recommended
halting the risky transfer of chemical stocks and giving the Allies the location

of the sites. Hitler vetoed this order.'08 Nonetheless, there was no escalation.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND INADVERTENCE

Variations in inadvertent escalation in World War II are explained better by

organizational culture than other prominent images of escalation. The significant influence of culture is summarized in Table 1. There are two key
facets of the link between organizational culture and inadvertence. The first
"Mitteilungen uber Gaskriegsvorbereitungen im Ausland Nr. 10," August 12, 1941, RH 11 IV/v.
17, BA-MA.
106. This incident is related by Lord Ritchie-Calder, who was Director of Political Warfare in
the Foreign Office during the Second World War. See Steven Rose, ed., CBW: Chemical and
Biological Warfare (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 14.
107. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, "Gaskriegsvorbereitungen," February 4, 1945, RW 4/v.
720, BA-MA.
108. Rolf-Dieter Mueller, "World Power Status Through the Use of Gas? German Preparations
for Chemical Warfare," in Wilhelm Diest, ed., The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London:
Macmillan, 1981), pp. 200-201; Stephen L. McFarland, "Preparing for What Never Came: Chemical and Biological Warfare in World War II," Defense Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1986), p. 114; F.H.
Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol.
III, Part II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 577 and 929-930. Brown, Chemical
Warfare, p. 237, suggests that Hitler may have ordered gas attacks at the end of the war but
officers and officials did not carry out his command.
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Table 1. A Summary of the Cases. Does Theory Predict Inadvertence?
Traditional

Security Organization Organizational Actual
Friction Dilemma Theory Culture Outcome
SUBMARINE WARFARE
U.K. Oxely accident ? ? Yes Yes Yes
U.K. Bremen non-accident No No Yes No No
Germany No No Yes Yes Yes
STRATEGIC BOMBING
U.K.
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Germany Yes No Yes No No
CHEMICAL WARFARE
U.K.
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Germany Yes Yes Yes No No

connects organizational predilections to the types of accidents that are likely.

Clausewitz tells us that accidents are unpredictable and unavoidable in the
complexity of war. The incidents reviewed above do seem to have multiple
causes and do not fit neatly under any one theory except the vastly gener-

alized and residual one of friction. Nonetheless, some accidents may fit more

of a pattern than would be suggested by a random-walk thesis. Some degree
of regularity matches organizations to accidents, as Graham Allison sug-

gested in Essence of Decision.'09 But the thrust of Allison's argument-and that
of others who have employed traditional organization-theory logic-assumes
that, in gross terms, similar organizations act in similar ways. According to
this logic we should expect militaries with the same structures and functions

to incur the same types of incidents. But this emphasis on structure neglects
the importance of beliefs and norms. As was demonstrated by the differences

between the accidents of German and British submarines, similar structures

and functions did not produce the same type of results. The submarine forces

of both navies were prepared to target and destroy enemy ships. But the
British Navy saw only a role for hitting warships, whereas the German

109. E.g., Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 139-140. Where friction was comparable-for example
in the British and German submarine situations-an accident occurred in one, but not in the

other. And even where friction is expected to be most decisive-where warfare is complex,
fighting intense, and information uncertain-accidents did not cause escalation. This was apparent in the restraint that enduted in CW during the fierce battles on the continent in the latter
stages of WWII.
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Navy considered anti-trade attacks as a central form of warfare. A focus on
this divergence in the hierarchy of beliefs in military organizations more
accurately accounts for what occurred. The role of culture is more important-and the influence of the armed forces more varied in that they can also
inhibit accidents, than is recognized by friction, the security dilemma, or a
traditional organization viewpoint.

The second, and more important, tie between organizational culture and

accidents concerns the impact of the unintended incidents that do occur.
Avoiding accidents altogether may be an impossible task. But as we have

seen, some accidents lead to escalation, while others do not. Contrary to the

expectations of the traditional organizational school, militaries do not always
push events towards escalation, even after hostilities have begun. Depending

on culture, military organizations may act as inhibitors or as advocates of
escalation. The armed forces play a central role in war through the devel-

opment of capabilities, planning, information processing, operational response, and judging military utility, and their cultures thereby have a decisive
impact on national choices. Where specific means of warfare are compatible

with one side's organizational culture, accidental use of a taboo means of
warfare by the enemy often leads to escalation. Militaries and states in such

situations are likely to emphasize the antagonistic role the other side played,
encourage propagandistic use of the incident, and stress the military advantage in their own escalation. Such tendencies increase the likelihood of inadvertent escalation, as was evident in German submarine warfare and Britain's bombing of Berlin.
In contrast, when a type of warfare is antithetical to organizational culture,
restraint endures in the face of provocative enemy incidents. Information
encouraging escalation is suppressed, enemy actions are taken on faith to be

accidents, efforts are made to communicate good will to the opposing side,
and internal proposals to seize propaganda advantages are rejected. These
dynamics were evident in German strategic bombing, and British and German decisions related to chemical warfare. As we have seen, escalation
windows are inevitably thrown open in the midst of conflict by the unintended and often unpredictable incidents that occur in "unthinkable" restricted means of warfare. But whether states jump through those windows
seems to be importantly affected by military culture.
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Contemporary Inadvertence

Some of the taboos of the inter-war period remain intact to varying degrees
today. Chemical and biological warfare continue to be stigmatized, and so
too is strategic bombing, as seen in the allied efforts to avoid civilian casualties

in the Gulf War. The most striking distinction between the period examined
above and the modern age is the immensely destructive force of nuclear

weapons."0I Some believe that any serious armed clash between major power
antagonists would be likely to result in nuclear use. Some assume that an
accidental event involving a nuclear weapon, particularly in the midst of

war, would lead to a widespread exchange.111 What the organizational culture
approach suggests, however, is that this need not be the case. Depending
on organizational predilection, some incidents are likely to lead to escalation
while others will not. Thus for national leaders, the ability to control escalation involves understanding and managing bureaucratic culture. This is a
different sort of enterprise than those suggested in other recent studies. It is
not about the technical specifications and procedures of command and con-

trol systems.112 Nor is it about the formal structural traits of organizations

themselves.113 Furthermore, the primary focus is not on the explicit nature of
civil-military relations and the problem of getting soldiers to adhere to the
orders and aims of the higher military or civilian leadership, although that
is certainly a concern.114
Rather, the policy task is first, to understand the norms and beliefs of

military services on war-fighting that permeate the plans, capabilities, and
110. It is unlikely that these powerful tools of violence have neutralized the dynamics of the
images of inadvertence discussed here. Friction, the security dilemma, and organizational dynamics have all figured prominently in research on the nuclear age; e.g., Barry Posen uses all
three in his study Inadvertent Escalation.
111. This is the predominant thrust of traditional organization theory, "friction," and "normal
accident" theorists, along with most who study nuclear accidents. See Bracken, "Accidental
Nuclear War," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Hawks,
Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), pp. 3749; and Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 250-51, 259-264. For an argument that rejects this
thinking, see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic
Books, 1989), pp. 237-238.
112. E.g., Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War.
113. Although they acknowledge the role of culture, this is the focus of the "high reliability"
theorists discussed in Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 14-28.
114. On control of U.S. nuclear weapons, this issue is covered thoroughly by Peter Douglas

Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1992).
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skills available to keep the peace. Secondly, it is to shape that culture, if
necessary, so that it is compatible with national objectives. These tasks are
far from simple. Professional military cultures form in a society set apart
from the broader nation they serve, and such organizations have no domestic

competitors to ensure that the consumer (i.e., national interest) is wellserved. Even in the United States, where there is a tradition of civilian

oversight and "independent" bodies to contribute to military thinking, outsiders (especially those who spend four years in Washington and then move
on) sometimes have problems gaining obedience to explicit directives, let

alone the ability to affect organizational culture.115 Nonetheless, there is a
need for alternative parties-probably civilian experts authorized by the high-

est levels of government-to review operational plans.116 This is not about
who has the final say in using force: that is clearly the political leadership.
Instead, the issue is how choice is subtly, but powerfully, circumscribed by
the pre-existing organizational mind-set, with its attendant capabilities, skills,
and intelligence, that dominates operational thinking. Thus, the central task
is to explicate and assess the assumptions and beliefs that shape the way
that militaries think about practical war-fighting in terms both of their own
efficacy and of political objectives.
The aim of such an effort would not be to de-professionalize or to politicize

America's competent armed forces.117 Nor is it to blame soldiers for doing
an inadequate job. Militaries cannot be considered the cause of war, nor
should they be pictured as an unwavering source of escalation. The armed

forces can act as a friend of restraint as well as a foe (and either role might
serve a national purpose). Nonetheless, the pervasive influence of military
culture on inadvertence suggests the need to improve understanding of the
beliefs and norms that characterize these organizations. It is certainly in the
national interest, and to the benefit of international security, that war-fighting
cultures be compatible with higher level political strategy and goals.
115. A range of anecdotes and analysis on this topic are found in Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of
the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 5-6, 31-32, 248285; and Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, pp. 227-229, 232-234, 242-244.
116. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 217, offers some good proposals along these lines.
117. The dangers of doing so have been articulated in the classic work by Samuel P. Huntington,
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1957).

